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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
EQUALITY, FAIRNESS AND 315: THE FRUSTRATION
OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
By HARRY R. BLAINE*
"In the house of breathings lies that word, all fairness."**
INTRODUCTION
In August of 1960, section 315 (a) of the Communications
Act of 19341 was suspended for the then forthcoming Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential campaigns.2 The immediate
results of this action were the so-called great debates
* B.A., 1958, The Ohio State University; LL.B., 1962, Yale University;
Staff Member, Labor Education and Research Service of The Ohio State
University.
** Joyce, Finnegan's Wake.
I If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no
power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use
of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified
candidate on any:
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candi-
date is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered
by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not
limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the
meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be
construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presenta-
tion of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-
spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them
under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues
of public importance. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
See generally, Friedenthal and Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulations
on Political Broadcasting: Section 815 of the Communications Act, 72 HARv.
L. REv. 445 (1959).
Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 544 (August 24, 1960) provides that it be:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That that part of section
315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, which re-
quires any licensee of a broadcast station who permits any person
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station to afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, is
suspended for the period of the 1960 presidential and vice presidential
campaigns with respect to nominees for the offices of President and
Vice President of the United States. Nothing in the foregoing shall be
construed as relieving broadcasters from the obligation imposed upon
them under this Act to operate in the public interest."
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between Presidential aspirants Kennedy and Nixon,3 and
the virtual blackout of minority party candidates.4 Hailed
by broadcasters and politicians alike,5 the suspension actu-
ally increased television network sustaining time in the
1960 campaign,6 and thus lent credence to a long time indus-
try claim that section 315 had, in actuality, contributed to
the frustration of democratic politics.7
Public Law No. 86-677, the suspension of equal time
amendment, was the penultimate stage in a long series of
attacks upon section 315.1 Unsuccessful only insofar as
they failed to receive permanent and complete relief from
section 315,9 broadcasters have self-admittedly "proved that
they can handle the freedom they asked for,"'10 and have
a These debates, four in number, appeared on September 26, 1960, from
9:30-10:30 p.m. - NYT, Oct. 7, 1960, from 7:30-8:30 p.m. - NYT, Oct. 13,
1960, from 7:30-8:30 p.m. - NYT, and Oct. 21, 1960, from 10:00-11:00 p.m. -
NYT, Broadcasting, Nov. 7, 1960, p. 29.
'Hearings Before the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 24,
112, 113 (1961). [hereafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
I Broadcasting, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 33.
'Total sustaining time on three major television networks (ABC, CBS,
NBC) increased from 29:38 to 39:22. 1961 Hearings 113.
1 See the statement of Mr. David Sarnoff of NBC in Hearings Before
the Communications Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-26 (1959). [hereafter cited as
1959 Hearings]:
"We believe that the basic principle underlying the equal time pro-
vision is to insure the people of a fair, balanced presentation of the
political facts and arguments they need to know to govern themselves.
"Certainly, that principle cannot be served by discouraging such
presentations altogether. Yet that has been the historic effect of Sec-
tion 315.
"It has been a deterrent rather than a stimulant; it has clogged the
political pump it was intended to prime ...
"It is patently in the public interest for broadcasters to offer appro-
priate [free] time for talks by the major party candidates bor Presi-
dent and Vice President. But if they do, Section 315 requires them to
give every other candidate for these offices equal time.
"In 1956 that would have meant equal time for those fifteen-odd
candidates as well as their running mates.
"In 1956, the aggregate of all minor party candidates barely ex-
ceeded one per cent of the total popular vote. Yet if we were to
observe Section 315, these candidates would occupy far more air time
than the candidates of the two major parties.
"To require hour upon broadcast hour to be devoted to the quixotic
antics of little-known candidates; to require this so that the public
might listen for just one hour to the candidates in whom they are
really interested, is, in my opinion, a miscarriage of common sense
and a disservice to the public.
"Such an exercise in tedium might well destroy public interest in
listening even to the major candidates."
'See 1959 Hearings, supra note 7. See also Salant, Political Campaigns
and the Broadcaster, in 8 Public Policy 336 (Friedrich and Harris ed.,
1958), Broadcasting, Oct. 15, 1956, p. 88, March 23, 1959, p. 130, May 25,
1959, pp. 58, 62.
' See Broadcasting, May 25, 1959, p. 58.
"0Id., Oct. 10, 1960, p. 33.
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pushed, more or less successfully, for suspension privileges
in the 1964 Presidential and Vice Presidential campaigns."
The major argument against suspension, "that broadcasters
cannot be counted on to deal fairly with candidates,"'" was
effectively argued against by the industry before the fact,"
and in retrospect seemed to be a groundless fear;14 appar-
ently, only the minority parties suffered," and these, it
would seem, are no longer considered relevant to democracy
in America.' 6
EQUALITY AND FAnuEsS: 1927-1959
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 was a
holdover from the Radio Act of 1927.17 Although appar-
ently designed more to insure a candidate's right to speak
than the public's right to listen," section 315 and its coun-
terpart in the area of public interest, the fairness doc-
trine," have become, in the hands of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, the front line of defense of the public
interest in the right to hear divergent points of view.2"
Originally separate, these concepts in political broadcast-
ing were fused in the 1959 amendment to the original sec-
tion 315.21 That amendment was the culmination of two
long, and superficially distinct series of events, one series
dealing with section 315 and the equality doctrine, the other
"The Wall Street Journal, Friday, May 8, 1964, p. 1, col. 3. See also
Broadcasting, Nov. 25, 1963, p. 66.
"Broadcasting, May 25, 1949, p. 62.
See Id., June 6, 1960, p. 82.
14At least where the two major parties were concerned. See 1961
Hearings 113.
See the statement of Mr. Eric Haas: "When a democratic society cur-
tails the right of minority candidates to be heard, and to be heard on equal
terms with major party candidates, it ceases tto be democratic." Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on
Commerce on S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 200 (1962). [heretafter cited
at 1962 Hearings].
"6 Thomas H. Eliot has argued that 'this is because Americans have reached
a consensus so broad that there is no need for minority parties. ELIOT,
GOVERNING AMEsIcA 277-79 (1964).
:" 1 Pike and Fischer Current Service 10:99.
18See the speech of Senator Howell: "We furthermore provide in this
bill that if one candidate was allowed to address his eonstituency his
opponent should be Mllowed to make addresses also, and if all could not
have this privilege, then no one should have the privilege." 67 Cong.
Rec. 12504 (1926).
1 See generally Barron, The Federal Communications Fairness Doctrine:
An Evaluation, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1961).
N'ote, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HAxv. L. REv.
701, 707 (1964). Report of Editorializing by Licensees, 1 R.R., pt. 3,
91:201, 204 (1949).
2 73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). See generally
Note., Radio and Television Appearances of Candidates for Ofce: Amended
Section 815 of the Communications Act, 69 YALE L.J. 805 (1960).
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with the series of decisions and rulings that constitute the
fairness doctrine.
The first attempt to invoke section 315 came in 1936
when station WCAE in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, refused
to broadcast a radio address by Earl Browder, the Presi-
dential nominee of the Communist Party.22 Since that time,
the Commission has had opportunity to lay down a com-
prehensive body of law dealing with the broadcast of
political speeches.
Prior to the 1959 Lar Daly decision,23 there were only
two exceptions to the concept of use2" by a legally qualified
candidate.2 5  The first was the Blondy decision,26 which
exempted the appearance of candidates on regularly
scheduled newscasts where the candidates had in no way
initiated the filming or the presentation by the station. The
second was the CBS decision of 1956,27 which exempted a
report to the people by the President of the United States.
Section 315 applies at every electoral level" and to both
primary and general elections,2 9 forbids censoring of can-
didates' statements, ° and confers immunity upon the broad-
caster against libel suits based on section 315 speeches.3'
2N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1936, p. 24, col. 5. See generally: note, Communi-
cation Act - §315 - Censorship - Equal Facilities for Political Candi-
dates, 7 AIR L. Rnv. 313 (1936).
2OCBS, Inc., 18 R.R. 238 (1959).
" Apparently any appearance before camera or microphone is considered
to be a use. See 69 YALE L.J. 805, 806 (1960).
The Commission's rules define this term as:
"[A]ny person who has publicly announced that he is a candidate for
nomination by a convention of a political party or for nomination or
election in a primary, special, or general election, municipal, county,
state, or national, and who meets the qualifications presented by the
applicable laws to hold the office for which he is a c¢andidate, so that
he may be voted for by the electorate directly or by means of delegates
or electors, and who -
(1) Has qualified for a place on the ballot or,
(2) Is eligible under the applicable law to -be voted for by sticker,
by writing in his name on the ballot, or other method, and
(i) Has been duly nominated by a political party which is
commonly known and regarded as such, or
(ii) Makes a substantial showing that he is a bona fide can-
didate for nomination of office as the case may be."
Sections 3.190, 3.290, 3.590, 3.657, as listed in 11 R.R. 1507 (1954). For an
account of state requirements, see Note, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party
Success, 57 YALE L.J. 1276 (1948).
-' Letter to Allan H. Blondy, 14 R.R. 1199 (1957).
7Letter to OBS, 14 R.R. 722 (1956).
28 See note 5, supra.
2
.KWFT, Inc., 4 R.R. 885 (1948). However, the Commission has ruled
that a station need not grant equal time to a minor party candidate even
though time has been made available to major party candidates in a
primary election. Arnold Peterson, 11 R.R. 1507 (1954).
10 See note 1, supra.
"I Farmers Educational and Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360
U.S. 525, 531 (1959).
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Early in 1959 the Commission virtually abandoned the
position taken in the Blondy decision. In the Lar Daly case,
the Commission held that the use of film clips showing
Democratic and Republican candidates for the office of
Mayor of Chicago, Illinois, was a use within the meaning
of the statute and ordered that equal time be made avail-
able to Lar Daly, a perenially unsuccessful candidate in
municipal, state and national elections.2
The fairness doctrine originated in a 1941 decision of the
Federal Communications Commission." In this case, the
Commission held that (1) a broadcaster cannot be an advo-
cate and (2) when public issues are discussed, all shades
of opinion must be presented equally."' The next step in
the evolution of the fairness doctrine, the Scott case,35 held
broadcasters to a high degree of responsibility in contro-
versial issues programming, setting the width and breadth
of the First Amendment as the test of the public interest
requirements of the statute. 6 Following the Scott decision,
the Commission, in Blue Book,37 regularized the require-
ment of fairness, stating that (1) the public interest re-
quires that adequate amounts of time be set aside for dis-
cussion of public issues and (2) the Commission would
appraise the amount of time devoted to the discussion of
public issues in determining whether or not a licensee has
served the public interest. 8
In 1949, the Commission issued the Report on Edi-
torializing by Licensees,39 reversing the trend of the May-
flower Broadcasting Corp. decision,4" by stating that edi-
torializing was permissible. 1 The Commission retained the
Scott and Blue Book doctrines, however, in demanding that
broadcasters make time available for "expositions" of vari-
ous positions taken by responsible groups.4
The 1959 amendment to section 315, by its specific ex-
emption of newscasts, bona fide interviews, documentaries
and news events from the equal time requirements,43 re-
versed the Commission application of the equality doctrine
as embodied in the Lar Daly decision. The amendment
2CBS, Inc., 18 R.R. 238 (1959).
m Mayflower iBroadcasting Corp., 8 FCC 333 (1941).
8 FCC 333, 340 (1941).
Rbert H. 'Scott, 3 R.R. 259 (1946).
N Id., at 261-63.
"FCC Public Notice 95462 (March 27, 1946).
Id., at 40.
"1 R.R., pt. 3, 91:201 (1949).
"08 FCC 333 (1941).
1 Id., at 91:207.
42 Id., at 91:206.
," See note 21, supra.
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sustained and endorsed, however, the Commission's fair-
ness doctrine as outlined in the Report on Editorializing by
Licensees.4 Finally, in 1963, at the behest of the Senate
Subcommittee on Freedom of Communication,4 5 the Com-
mission issued a Public Notice,4" which broadened the fair-
ness doctrine by applying four specific decisions47 to the
broadcasting industry in general.
An explicit part of the fairness doctrine is the area
dealing with sustaining time for political broadcasts. The
fairness doctrine only comes under review at the time of
an application for license renewal;" if a station has provided
no sustaining time for political broadcasts, this will weigh
against it when the Commission considers the application.49
1960: THE SUSPENSION OF EQUAL TIME
Early in 1960, Congress considered legislation designed
to provide free television network time to all presidential
parties who had polled over four per cent in the previous
general election. 0 A combination of factors made this bill
44 See note 39, supra, and Note, Radio and Television Appearances of
Candidates for Office: Amended Section 315 of the Commrnmication At,
69 YALE L.J. 805, 812 (1960).
45108 Cong. Rec. 7006 (1962).
4'FCC Public Notice 63-674, ('July 26, 1963), provides that:
"A broadcast licensee has an affirmative obligation to afford rea-
sonable -opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on
any controversial issue which he chooses to cover. If a controversial
program involves a personal attack upon an individual or organization,
the licensee must transmit the text of the broadcast to the person or
group attacked, wherever locaited, with a specific offer of his station's
facilities for an adequate response. When a licensee permits the use
of his facilities by a commentator or any person other than a candidate
to Ctake a partisan position on issues involved in a political campaign or
to attack one candidate or to support another by direct or indirect
identification, he must immediately send a transcript of the pertinent
continuity in each such program to each candidate concerned and offer
a comparable opportunity for an appropriate spokesman to answer
his broadcast. When a licensee permits the use 'of his facilities for
the presentation of views regarding an issue of current importance
such as racial segregation, integration, or discrimination, he must
offer spokesman for other responsible groups within the community
similar opportunities for the expression of the contrasting viewpoints
of their doctrine. For the purpose of the fairness doctrine it is imma-
terial under what particular label or form a point of view is expressed."
"Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 R.R. 404 (1963); Clayton W. May-
poles, 23 R.R. 586 (1962) ; Billings Broadcasting Co., 23 R.R. 951 (1962)
W'BN X Broadcasting Co., Inc., 4 R.R. 242 (1948).
0Robert M. McIntosh, 20 R.R. 55, 56-57 (1960).
"Ibid. See also Farmers Coop. v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, .534 (1959)
Homer P. Rainey, 3 R.R. 737, 742-43 (1947). But see Port Huron Broad-
casting Co., 12 FCC 1069 (1948).
0S. 3171, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1960). See generally, Hearings on
S. 3171 Before The Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1960). [Here-
inafter cited as 1960 Hearings.]
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fail: the Republican desire to avoid legislative compulsion51
which balanced the Democratic party's need to gain free
air time to bolster their depleted finances;52 industry pres-
sure which was brought to bear against any statutory
requirements of free time;5" the ability of the industry to
agree upon a series of programs to be carried on sustain-
ing time prior to the election which tipped the scales in
favor of a suspension of section 315 for the purposes of the
Presidential and Vice Presidential campaigns."
Although students of mass communication differ as to
the impact of mass media upon the individual voter," the
statistics dealing with the Kennedy-Nixon debates are im-
pressive. As reported by Broadcasting magazine, the de-
bates drew an average viewing audience of over sixty-
seven million persons." According to polls conducted by
Sindlinger and Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
as reported in Broadcasting, both votes and attitudes were
changed by the debates.5 And, although the sustaining
time coverage of major party candidates on television net-
works doubled, as compared to the 1956 election, 8 the
total charges for political broadcasts remained approxi-
mately the same,59 thus insuring that, in terms of network
coverage at least, the 1960 elections were more fully re-
ported than those in 1956.60
In addition,, an "unusual increase in voter interest,"'"
culminating in a record vote in 1960,62 was attributed by
industry spokesman to the use of the great debate format
which the suspension had made possible. Of great interest
too was the report that the debates had a holding power6 3
"N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1960, p. 18, col. 3.
511960 Hearings 179-82. See also Br'oadcasting, May 23, 1960, p. 76.
53 See .Broadcasting, March 21, 1960, pp. 48, 74.
See Id., May 23, 1960, p. 72.
"See KLAPPEn, TnE EFECTIVNESS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 53-56 (1960).
Broadcasting, Nov. 7, 1960, p. 29. Of course, the debates enjoyed a
virtual blackout of competition, with an average of 470 network affiliated
stations out of 491 carrying the debates. 1961 Hearings 116.
"7 According to these polls, 31.2 per cent of those who viewed the debates
wanted Kennedy tlo win, prior to the first debate; 39.3 per cent wanted
Nixon to win. After the fourth debate, the percentage favored Kennedy,
40.5 to 38.1. Additionally, although viewers favored Nixon 37.3 per cent
to 23.4 per cent when asked who they thought would win, by the fourth
debate, the percentages favored Kennedy, 33.0 to 29.1. Broadcasting,
Nov. 7, 1960, pp. 28-9.
The actual increase was from 18:68 to 37:47. 1961 Hearings 113.
Actually, total network charges for 1960 decreased from $2,930,514.00
to $2,927,235.00. 1961 Hearings 113.
0 H.R. Rep. No. 359, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963).
11 See Hearings 39.
"Ibid.
"Holding power" may be defined as that per cent of the original viewing
audience that is still viewing a program at its completion.
EQUALITY, FAIRNESS AND 315
of eighty-eight percent, as compared with hour long enter-
tainment programs' average of seventy-seven percent, and
CBS Report's sixty-seven percent. 64 Perhaps the most stir-
ring testimonial for the debates was given by President
Kennedy, who claimed that they had, in fact, won the elec-
tion for him.65
Of course, there were those who saw in the debates
something less than the finest hour of our civilization.
Minority political parties were naturally opposed to the
virtual suppression of their candidates' point of view;"6
moreover, both scholars ' and commentators 68 argued that
the debates were less than desirable. Despite these criti-
cisms, however, Congress pressed forward, with six pro-
posals being offered in the Senate alone, all pointing toward
complete elimination or partial restriction of section 315.69
Barring unforeseen accident, it appears certain that there
will be a suspension of section 315 for the Presidential and
Vice Presidential campaigns of 1964.70 The status of a
debate format is as yet uncertain as President Johnson has
not yet seen fit to commit himself to that type of television
campaign.7 1 Both politicians and the broadcasting industry
are agreed, however, that a suspension of equal time for
the 1964 Presidential and Vice Presidential campaigns is
desirable. 2
1961 Hearings 46.
6 Broadcasting, Nov. 14, 1960, p. 29.
"As demonstrated by their testimony before various House and Senate
Committees. See generally 1959 Hearings, 1961 Hearings, 1962 Hearings.
61 Commager, Washington Would Have Lost a TV Debate, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1960 (Magazine), p. 13.
61 Shayon, TV and Radio: Another Viewpoint, 44 Sat. Rev. 33 (Jan. 7,
1961).
01 Hearings Before the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5-7. These bills restricted or
eliminated Section 315 as follows:
S. 204: would exempt the President and Vice President from
Section 315.
S. 2035: would exempt the President and Vice President,
United States Senator, Representative and Governor
of any State from :Section 315.
S. 3434: would exempt all candidates for public office from
Section 315.
S.J. Res. 193: would exempt the President and Vice President from
Section 315 for period of the 1964 election.
S.J. lRes. 196: would exempt Senators and Representatives from
Section 315 for period of the 1962 election.
S.J. Res. 209: would exempt Senators, Representatives, and Gover-
nors from Section 315 for the period of the 1962
election, and the President and Vice President for
the period of the 1964 election.
7O See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
"Broadcasting, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 78; Alsop, The Coming Attack on Lyndon
Johnson, 273 Slt. Even. Post 15 (Mar. 28, 1964); Brioadcasting, May 11,
1964, pp. 54-55.
"Broadcasting, May 11, 1964, pp. 54-55.
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THE FRUSTRATION OF DEMOCRATIC PoLrIcs
The broadcasting industry has advanced two major
arguments against the continued operation of section 315:
(1) that the industry cannot afford equal time on a sus-
taining basis for all candidates" and (2) that oversatura-
tion of the public by political broadcasts will detsroy in-
terest in politics. 74 Both arguments have, it would seem,
enough truth in them to lend support for industry demands
of relief from section 315. An hour of prime evening time
on television networks sold, for example, during the
1960 Presidential campaign, for a network average of
$123,550.00. 7 5 It has been estimated that, in 1952, it would
have cost CBS alone a total of $10,500,000.00 to have pro-
vided one-half hour of prime time for each of the Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential candidates. 76 Even though the
industry is making record profits,77 this is a considerable
burden for them to bear. In addition, television audiences,
the great debate notwithstanding, are not enthusiastic
viewers of political broadcasts. 8
These arguments are not, however, altogether convinc-
ing.79 The first, for example, has been countered by Mr.
Nathan Karp in testimony before a Congressional Com-
mittee: "It would seem a small enough inconvenience for
them [broadcasters] to suffer in return for the privilege
and opportunity they have been granted to exploit the
public air waves for their private profit."8 " It would appear
also that industry estimates of minority-candidate demands
for free time have been grossly exaggerated.8" Finally, in
light of the increase in television network sustaining time
in 1960 as compared to the 1956 campaign,82 it is difficult
1 Salant, Political Campaigns and the Broadcaster, 8 Public Policy 336,
340-41 (Friedrich and Harris Ed. 1958). That time must be free if it is to
be equal is well illustrated by the experience of the 1960 Presidential cam-
paign. There all parties excluding the Democratic and Republican, spent
$400,000.00 for political broadcasts, as compared to a total of $14,250,000.00
spent by the two major parties. 1961 Hearings 112.
14 See note 7, 8upra.
Ranging from ABC-TV's low of $110,770.00 per hour to CBS-TV's high
of $130,000.00. Broadcasting, March 21, 1960, p. 76.
16 Salant, op. cit. supra, at 341-2.
Broadcasting, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 35.
Is It has been claimed, for example, that a political broadcast of even five
minutes duration decreases the normal viewing audience of the following
program by 15 per cent. Salant, op. cit. supra, at 340.
', See note 65, supra and accompanying text.
10 1959 Hearings 278-79.
11 For example, in 1960 while the Democratic and Republican candidates
requested over 266 hours of television sustaining time (of which 17:32
was refused), minority party candidates requested only 30 hours (of which
10:47 was refused). FCC, Survey of Political Broadcasting, Table 15 (1961).
82 See note 6, supra.
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to understand the industry's contention that they cannot
afford section 315.
The second industry argument, public dissatisfaction
with political broadcasts, is, on its face, more difficult
to counter. Undoubtedly, political broadcasts, generally
speaking, have an adverse effect upon a network's holding
power. 83 Moreover, this is true of most controversial issue
programming.84 However, unless the industry argues that
profits are the exclusive aim of the media,"5 it would appear
to be a matter of judgment as to how much political pro-
gramming an audience will accept: while the industry
presumably has expertise in this area, considerations of the
nature of a democratic society would appear to be more
relevant.
The continued existence of democracy depends upon
liberty of thought and discussion. 6 As Mill has stated, "If
all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be
no more justified in silencing that one person, then he, if
he had the power, would be justified in silencing man-
kind."8 " That this is the theory underlying American
democracy is well illustrated by the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States.8 8
The Federal Communications Commission has indicated
that this theory lies at the heart of the fairness doctrine.
In the Report on Editorializing by Licensees, the Commis-
sion stated that:
"See note 77, 8upra. But see, White:
"The broadcasters failure to adopt this [better] method leaves room
for the suspicion that some of them may have hoped that the very
dullest and clumsiness of the forum type of program would soon be
eliminated. The technique has become alarmingly common in radio:
one does the sort of thing he does not understand but feels compelled to
do in order to mollify the F.C.C. (or his more literate critics) ; he does
it as badly as possible and the Hooper ratings are low; so he turns
to his critics with a triumphant 'You see, the people just don't
want it'."
WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 215 (1947).
KLAPPER, op. cit. supra, at 38-43.
To my knowledge, no industry spokesman has gone to this extreme.
'MILL, On Liberty, in THE EYOGLIsH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL,
949, 90-91 (Burtt, ed., 1939).
Id. at 961.
"250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919):
"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our
Constitution."
1964]
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If, as we believe to be the case, the public interest
is best served in a democracy through the ability of
the people to hear expositions of the various positions
taken by responsible groups and individuals on particu-
lar topics and to choose between them, it is evident
that broadcast licensees have an affirmative duty gen-
erally to encourage and implement the broadcast of all
sides of controversial public issues over their facilities
over and beyond their obligation to make available on
demand opportunities for the expression of opposing
views.s9
All speech, however controversial, is not equally valu-
able for the preservation of democratic rights. Political
speech 90 is "instrumentally crucial in the defense and ex-
pansion of the whole range of actual and potential human
rights." Democracy postulates that political decisions are
influenced by the pressure of differing opinions. So long
as freedom of political speech exists, there is an oppor-
tunity for all political groups to be heard and to vindicate
their demands. As long as free speech exists on political
matters, freedom of expression on all other subjects exists
as well.91
Freedom of speech on political matters, in the sense of
freedom from governmental restraint, while still necessary,
is no longer sufficient to preserve democratic freedom. In
contemporary mass society,9 2 political propaganda can no
longer depend upon the technique of face to face contact.93
Propaganda is conducted by and through the mass com-
munication media. 94 As Karl Leowenstein has argued:
In our pluralist society the Leviathan speaks with
many voices. He who speaks loudest, longest, and at
the most convenient hours of radio and television re-
ception has for his message the ear of the greatest num-
ber of potential customers. He who fries the political
bacon with the most appetizing smell carries it home.
Or, to paraphrase the geopolitical law of Sir Harold
MacKinder: he who controls the mass communications
Report on Editorializing by Licensee8, 1 R.R., pt. 3, 91:201, 206 (1949).
10 Political 6peech may be defined as verbal expression dealing with or
bearing on political phenomena. BAY, THE STmucruRE OF FREEDOm 137
(1958).
91 Id. ait 136-39.
2 See generally, KORNHAuSmE, THE PoLIics OF MASS SociETY (1959).
L3 EOWENSTEnN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 338
(1957).
9 Ibid.
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media controls the electorate; he who controls the
electorate controls the political process.95
The political philosophy of the founding fathers dic-
tated that liberty was attainable only through the absence
of governmental restraint.96 This view of liberty engenders
two complementary but outmoded hypotheses: that in-
dividual liberty increases as governmental power decreases
and that government is the sole enemy of liberty.9" This
point of view is persuasively argued against by Franz
Neumann:
The theoretical falsity of the statement that liberty
decreases with the increase of governmental interven-
tion is obvious, since the term 'intervention' neither
indicates its purpose nor the interests against which
intervention is directed. The connection between the
two situations is a political-historical one, requiring
analysis of each concrete situation, for it is undeniable
that a minimum of intervention - the maintenance of
'law and order' - is always indispensible to the preser-
vation of individual rights, so that the very existence of
the state is a precondition for their exercise.
This, in turn, is closely tied up with the second
implication of the formula liberty versus government,
namely that the state is the sole enemy of liberty. That
this is fallacious reasoning should be obvious from the
fact that private social power can be even more dan-
gerous to liberty than public power. The intervention
of the state with respect to private power positions
may be vital to secure liberty.9"
Neumann further delineates three types of civil rights,
which as restraints upon power are necessary for the preser-
9 Id. at 340.
'Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
a NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 177 (1957).
"Id. at 177-78. Arthur S. Miller, in an article on constitutional law,
advanced much the same argument. Miller argues, basically, that power is
diffused in the United States. The state, while probably the most powerful,
is not necessarily the dominant member of large group of power holders,
which includes corporate enterprise, labor and farm organizations, veterans
legions, charitable foundations and others. Given this wide dispersion of
power, the most pressing problem of constitutional law is the relationship
of the state and the individual to other centers of power. Miller's basic
proposition is, that governing pi)wer, wherever located, should be subject
to the fundamental constitutional limitations of due process of law. The
Constitution in his opinion, should be construed to apply to all arbitrary
applications of power against individuals by centers of private government.
Miller, The Constitutional Law of the Security State, 10 STAN. L. REv. 620,
625-26, 662-63 (1958). See also, MILLER, PRIVATE GOVMNMENTS AND THE
CoNsTrrUTION (1959).
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vation of freedom in a democracy: personal, societal, and
political. The first two rights are inherent in the nature of
man, while the third is derived from the nature of the
political system. Personal rights are those whose validity
is bound solely to man as an isolated individual: they are
not dependent upon changes in the economic, social, or
political structure. Societal rights are those which are
exercised in relation to other members of society: they are
specifically rights of communication. Personal rights,
while they are ends in themselves, are also ancillary to
societal rights: without security of person, there can be
no communication. 99
Since personal rights are independent of socio-economic
change and.political expediency, there is an indispendable
minimum which is the right of every individual. This
minimum, however, is decreasing because of the applica-
tion of socio-economic sanctions to the individual. In addi-
tion, societal rights are jeopardized by the economic imbal-
ance existing in modern society. Only intervention by the
state can restore a balance of social forces necessary for
the continued operation of civil rights.10
These arguments are directly applicable to the problem
of equal time for political candidates. Freedom of political
speech is necessary for the continued existence of
democracy. The free play of all ideas in the market place
is (or should be) the primary concern of all those in-
terested in the preservation of democracy. And, given
the nature of modern society, only government can preserve
this vital freedom. Given this view of democracy, it is the
duty of the state to foster minority views in the face of
both majority apathy and hostility,101 and against action by
private power groups such as the broadcasting industry.10 2
9 NEUMANN, op. cit. supra, at 173-76.
101 Id. at 188-89.101 SPiTz, DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POWER 19, 47 (1958).
12 Industry claims of violations of the First Amendment (see 1960
Hearings 220-23, 23648, 252-70; Broadcasting, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 46) are,
according to this theory, ill-considered. See the argument by Alexander
Mieklejohn:
"Just so far at any point, ,the citizens who are to decide on issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief
or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that
mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the
First Amendment to the Constitution is directed."
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT 26
(1948).
That the First Amendment does not apply to the government when it
seeks to enlarge freedom in the communications Industry is a fact that
broadcasters seem unable to accept. See Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944), NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1942).
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The Federal Communications Commission has consist-
ently moved in this direction through the medium of the
fairness doctrine. In 1946, the Commission held that, "Free-
dom of speech can be effectively denied by denying access
to the public means of making expression effective. . .. "'0'
In 1949, the Commission stated that, "The most significant
meaning of freedom of the radio is the right of the Ameri-
can people to listen to this great medium of communica-
tion free from any government dictation as to what they
can and cannot hear, and free from similar restraints by
private licensees.' ' 4 In addition, the series of cases center-
ing around the use of sustaining time by political candi-
dates points to a liberal interpretation of the public in-
terest in minority points of view as expressed by minority
candidates. 105
The problem is, of course, more far-reaching than the
circumference of section 315. The attitude prevalent in
America today is, seemingly, that minority parties are
unnecessary appendages to the political process,' as evi-
denced by state restrictions placed upon them in their
attempt to gain access to the ballot.0 7
Only a reversal of this more basic attitude will, in the
long run, preserve American democracy as we know it.
In the short run, however, minority parties, caught be-
tween two power centers, are swiftly disappearing from
the American scene. The reason for this reaction on the
part of the broadcasting industry and Congress is clear:
their immediate interest does not lie in the realm of equal
time for minority parties.
The broadcasting industry, operating as it does in a free
enterprise society, depends upon attracting and holding a
vast and varied audience.' Any programs which threaten
this audience will be opposed by the industry. 0 9 Added
to this, of course, is the considerable potential saving"0
afforded by the blackout of minority party candidates.
Finally, there is the threat of program content regulation
by the Commission, as embodied in section 315."'
1 3 Robert H. Scott, 3 R.R. 259, 262 (1946).
104 Report on Editorializing by Licensees, 1 R.R., pt. 3, 91:201, 211 (1949).
' See note 48, supra and accompanying text.
' See note 16, supra.
See generally Note, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Succe8s, 57 YALE
L.J. 1276 (1948).
'1 KLAPPE, op. cit. supra, at 38.
o Ibid.
110 See note 75, supra, and accompanying text.
" Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARv. L. REV.
701, 707 (1964).
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The major political parties which control the legislative
and executive branches of the government have an obvious
interest in denying media access to minority parties:
Television and radio have become integral parts
of political campaigns. By suspending the equal oppor-
tunity requirement of section 315 for presidential and
vice-presidential candidates, better television and radio
coverage of the campaigns of major presidential and
vice-presidential candidates is made possible. In the
absence of such suspension presidential and vice-presi-
dential candidates representing minor and splinter
parties would be entitled to broadcast opportunities
equal to those granted to such candidates of the major
political parties, thereby inhibiting to some extent ade-
quate coverage of the major candidates in the cam-
paign."2 (Italics added.)
This, coupled with the obvious advantages of free time and
the debate format, are most persuasive reasons for denying
equal access to minority party candidates.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate for democratic politics that minority
party candidates have become enmeshed in a web that
threatens to remove them from the current political scene.
It is imperative that our democracy, based as it is upon
the free play of ideas, foster and protect minority view-
points. The Federal Communications Commission by an
application of both the equality and fairness doctrines was
moving in that direction when suspension of section 315
effectively destroyed the base upon which the Commission
had built its policy.
The Commission, by its application of the fairness doc-
trine to sustaining time given to political candidates, has
implicitly realized that, where the minority parties are
concerned, only free time is equal time. That doctrine
must prevail or the United States will experience a con-
tinued frustration of democratic politics.
M House Rep. 359, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963). But see the statement
of Sens. Hartke, Javits & Keating. 105 Cong. Rec. 14457-58 (1959).
